The George Adams Interview — Part Seven

This story was submitted to the People’s War site by Bill Ross of the ‘Action Desk — Sheffield’ Team on behalf of George Adams, and has been added to the site with his permission. Mr. Adams fully understands the site's terms and conditions.
Other parts to this story can be found at:

INDEX: A7544630

=================================================
This is a transcript taken from audio footage made by the Department of Sound Recordings at the
Imperial War Museum,
Lambeth Road,
LONDON SE1 6H7.

It has been copied almost exactly as recorded, therefore the terminology and grammar are as spoken and have not been manipulated in any way. Where place names that could not be found in an atlas, and/or unfamiliar terminology are mentioned, phonetic spellings are used and are subject to alteration.

On some occasions, sentences were not completed; the following symbol is used to denote that: ……………………
Only repetition has been suppressed.

Bill Ross — BBC People’s War Story Editor.
================================================

Int: As the RAF regiment would have done.

GA: Yes, it was just a one off, to give them a hand. The old drome had had a terrible bombing. It used to be a concentrated bombing you know, you’d have these 27 aircraft over the target, and they’d be coming up to the target and you could always hear a burst of machine gun fire. Whether that was the signal to release the bombs or not, I don’t know, but you could always hear this burst of machine gun fire from the front planes, and then down they’d come. Those buildings, the ops room there had a terrific bomb crater, right on the top of it, it hadn’t come through.

Int: Had they managed to make the drome fairly unusable?

GA: They had, but they’d filled the holes in, then when they came within shell fire, it was hopeless getting anybody out there to fill holes in; workmen, anybody, so, some were left. They could get a plane down, but there were no planes on the island then hardly. The Hurricanes that they had were outnumbered, and also they were outflown. We had one come in from Sumatra. He didn’t stay, he flew off and that was the last we saw of our aircraft.

Int: Who was giving you your orders? Who was in command of your section in a job like that?

GA: We’d a corporal, we’d two corporals there, and the station defence officer. He issued the orders of what he wanted guarding and everything else, and we took it from there you see. There was one funny incident — it wasn’t funny at the time but afterward, we could laugh about it. It really was funny. When we got up there, first of all, these Australians hadn’t had a cooked meal for days and days. They wouldn’t go up into the headquarter areas, because it’d been bombed that much, and that’s what they were concentrating on when they came home. Anyhow, we went up there, we’d got to get something to eat, so we prepared the meal, and everybody had something to eat. The thing was, as soon as the siren went, all dromes, after they’d found out what was happening, this terrific concentrated bombing. As soon as the siren went, the trucks used to be there. Everybody used to bundle in and out into the rubber. They wouldn’t stop in the slit trenches round the area, you see. The sirens went a couple of times, and this happened, and “Oh, come on, come on,” until we got fed up, then, “Oh, blow this, we’re not going. We’ve got a meal prepared and we’re staying.” We got the cookhouse going and they got a meal. But I can understand how they felt because strangely enough, a lot of the admin. officers used to be in the forefront. They’d be away with the lads, so you could understand, after the hammering they’d got. You could understand how they felt because we thought about it afterwards. They had had a real hammering.

Int: What happened next?

GA: Well, this funny incident that happened: the sirens went — we’d got a little Ford van for running people around the drome, and there was a huge monsoon drain at the side of the road, tremendous, about eight feet wide, nice big drain, open — the sirens went, and after they’d picked the two guards up off the top post, “Right, get yer foot down.” They did, they got their foot down and they slid off the road, into this bend and straight into the monsoon drain, They got a large can — it was in the van when they took it over — a large can of red paint in the back and it went screeching down the drain, then it stopped. It threw everybody about, it threw the red paint about all over the place and everybody was covered in red paint, and the people who dashed up to……….”God, good God, look at ‘em, bleeding to death.” (Laughter) Anyway, they weren’t, they were badly shaken up.

Then it got to the pitch once they did get within range, where the group captain issued orders, no-one would go up the drome on the main road. They’d go round the back to the top of the drome. We defied him for a while. It was ridiculous really, we were very foolish I suppose. We’d got an armadillo truck there with double sides and all pebbles in the double sides, to protect it against shrapnel. We used to come down in that and they used to follow us down. We were never hit, surprisingly enough. A big cheer used to go when they missed and we were never hit. Finally, he stopped it, that had to stop.

Int: Your positions were on the hills near the straits, and the causeway near the aerodrome, is that right?

GA: The gun positions were on the hill; the guard positions were at the main gate, and then one right out at the top gate on a road that led down. If you continued on it, you could get down to the straits. It was only a rough track, and that was another position there. I think we’d got three gun posts on the top. The army had got some three point sevens there. On reflection, I think they were not three point sevens, they were Boffers. We had a twin Lewis on each of the posts up there, and then two men on the top post outside the entrance to the camp.

Int: Were there any major positions to stop the Japanese crossing the causeway?

GA: Yes, they’d got the Australians there just off the back of the causeway, they’d got them right round the straits, as far as they could stretch them in a fair depth. They’d blown the causeway, but with it being such a terribly strong causeway, very well built, I mean, it took a railroad over, and a road over. It took water pipes over from the mainland to the island, and in blowing it, they had to blow those, all that went, the water pipes. It wasn’t blown — shall I say, there was a big hole in it, right across, which could be easily bridged, which they did, after they’d got the first foot on the island. They soon got that filled in and over.

Int: It sounds like your positions were more like sentries — there was nothing much you could do.

GA: That’s right, there was nothing you could do. You could fire at any low flying aircraft from our gun points. It wasn’t a very nice situation on that top post, as I found out one day. They were shelling and they started shelling the gun post on the hill above us, and daytime, as I remember, you were on yer own up there. They were shelling onto the hill. There was this buzzing, BZZZZZ BBZZZZZ, buzzing past me and I thought, “Oh, they must have hit some hornets’ nest or something.” Then the next thing, BBZZZZ, there was quite a large piece, as big as a walnut, of shrapnel, stuck in a rubber tree, a foot from my head. I thought, “Well, there’s nothing much I can do about it.” I got down then.

Int: They were aiming at the gun position.

GA: Yes, the gun position.

Int: Did they hit it?

GA: No they didn’t, they never hit it but, this went on for quite a long time. I was down there, facing up the track with my gun there, and who should come along, but our group captain. He’d been down the track; he must have come in from round the back somewhere.

Int: The airfield……..?

GA: The airfield group captain with, I believe he was a brigadier. I scrambled to my feet and gave him the salute, and he said, “What’s wrong airman, is it pretty hot here?” I said, “Very hot sir, look at this.” It was still smoking actually, the lump of shrapnel in the rubber tree. He sez, “Haven’t you got a slip trench or anything?” I said, “No, we have no men to dig them. We’ve just enough for guard and that’s it.” Now we’d got the gun posts manned, that was it. You’d stand there and it got very unpleasant at times, on that post.

Int: You just had some sandbags.

GA: No, we’d nothing there. We’d nothing!

Int: Nothing at all?

GA: Nothing! Only the rubber trees around us, that was all. Behind us there was a Punjabi section; they were frightened to death

REEL 6

GA:………………Oh, it was tremendous, we knew they’d made the put. We knew they were getting ready for it and we knew they’d made the put. I was on that top post, I think I was on until two o’clock in the morning, if I remember rightly. There was still this terrific racket, gunfire. Not quite as bad as it was in the initial, but it was bad enough and it was dying down gradually. Who should come up but our corporal in the van with a driver. We yelled at him to put the headlights out; he’d got the headlights full on and he jumped out of the van. They’d had word from ops that a Japanese patrol had broken through on the track up to the drome. What can yer do? We can’t send you anybody else because we’re that tight for men. The only thing we can do is to sit tight and get behind the rubber trees, facing up the track, that’s all we could do. The Punjabis had got a Lewis gun in a pit facing up the track, the same as we were. I’d got someone with me who was very very nervous. It was strange that because when he told me………….

Int: Another fitter?

GA: Yeah, another airman with me who was very nervous. It was strange really because I felt that when I knew what was happening, I did feel a little bit better than when I didn’t know anything, you were waiting all the time. When you could expect something, you knew, alright, you could do something about it, but he was in a terrible state.

Int: How did he show you he was afraid?

GA: Well, he….he…continuously for a while: “What shall we do, what shall we do, what shall we do?” I said, “There’s nothing much yer can do is there? Get down and hope for the best, and if they do come, you open fire and fall back.” But the problem was, these Punjabis…………..I said, “It’s Hobson’s choice because as soon as they hear anything coming back towards them, they’ll open up so, yer’ll have it from the back and the front, so you’re in between two fires.”

Int: What about your officers, where were they, or the officers from the aerodrome?

GA: The defence officer wasn’t there, he was back in the ops room with the group captain and everyone. We saw very few of the other officers, the admin officers never used to come into our line of work at all.

Int: Did you see any sign of this Japanese patrol?

GA: No, nothing. Nothing materialised, thank goodness, and we were relieved at 2 o’clock, and the people who went on, they never saw anything, nothing happened.

Int: Did this chap who was so afraid, did that affect you, because………….?

GA: I think it begins to, but you’ve got to fight it, otherwise you start to……….. panic spreads.

Int: How did you feel about him, were you cross with him or what?

GA: Not really, I suppose yer think, “Well, it’s just one of these things. The bloke’s cracking up,” and one thing led to another. It was getting rather tense and he was just cracking up and there was nothing much you could do about it.

Int: So you were relieved later on?

GA: Yes, and they never had any trouble afterwards, that was alright.

Int: Did you find out what had happened to them later on?

GA: No, I never found anything out. You never got to know anything like that. Then, as I remember it, a day or so after, we were all pulled back, down onto the ops room, around that area. We’d always got a guard round the ops room, patrolling round and in that area. Everyone was pulled back. The army was up at that end then. They’d fallen back, or brought some more troops. I think they must have formed a line up there where we’d been on guard, because we were pulled out and moved back into headquarters area. We were instructed whatever we did, not to step out into open ground. Well, we knew this because whenever you stepped out into the open ground, in view of the mainland, Malaya, they’d still lob a few shells over, so we stayed all round the ops room. We’d still got the lads; we were still relieving gun posts; we were still up there on the top, but otherwise, there was a guard down at the guardroom at the main gate, but the bulk of us were up in the ops room at the headquarters area.

Int: What did you have round the aerodrome, was it barbed wire or something?

GA: Yes, barbed wire.

Int: Was it a serious obstacle, or just a marker?

GA: Not really, not a serious obstacle at all really. I remember scrambling through it one morning. It didn’t stop you at all. Whilst you were there, it was, I think it was about four days, perhaps three days before the surrender. It might have been a bit closer than that. No, three or four days before we came out I should say, not the surrender. We came out from the airfield on the eleventh, it’d be about the tenth — ninth or tenth.

Int: So, they’d got across the straits, but they’d been held, the Japanese.

GA: No, they hadn’t been held, they were breaking through all round, they were continuously breaking through, and our people were having to fall back all the time.

Int: But they weren’t coming your way?

GA: No.

Int: Sorry, I interrupted you, you were saying, on the tenth.

GA: I think it’d be about the tenth.

Int: Roughly?

GA: Yes. We were told by the adjutant who was the worse for drink, waving his revolver about, to take up positions in the firing trenches, and everybody looked at him as if to say, what’s he talking about? He said, “Move them off Corporal.” Our corporal moved us off and we moved into our sleeping quarters.

Int: Now, why didn’t you obey the order, was there actually nothing happening?

GA: We’d no firing positions; we’d nowhere to go really, there was nothing happening.

Int: So he was talking rubbish.

GA: Yes, he was in a right state really; he was in a terrible state.

Int: Had his nerve gone, do you think?

GA: I think so, yes. He was — since then, I’ve felt sorry for him because he’d cracked up really bad, and he followed us into this room, and still waving his revolver, he got on the stage, and one of the admin officers came in to tell him that the group captain wanted to see him because he must have got the gist of what was going on. Somebody must have told him what was happening. He just pushed him aside, “I’ll come when I’m ready,” sort of. Just after that, a couple of the service police came in and escorted him out. We thought that was the end of it. He can be in serious trouble, but that’s too bad, that’s the end of it. It was only five or ten minutes afterwards when the group captain came in and addressed us, and I thought it was very big really, of him. He apologised to us for the behaviour, and he said how sorry he was.

Int: Which squadron was he in command of, or which group, do you remember?

GA: I can’t remember. He was in command of ops room up there, and the station itself, but it was an Australian squadron that had been on that drome.

Pt 8: A7542867

Pr-BR

© Copyright of content contributed to this Archive rests with the author. Find out how you can use this.