7 Field Company — 8th Indian Division, the Rapido Crossing and Monte Cassino, 1944

This is the third of four sections of an account written by my father Philip Hamer Howarth. It follows on from his experiences with the 2nd Bn King’s Own Royal Regiment in the Middle East and Tobruk (A8943681) to his time in Italy with the King George V's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners (A8944086). He wrote it several years before he died in March 2005.

Operation 'HONKER', the offensive to take Cassino and break the entire German defence line extending to the sea, was scheduled for the night of 11/12 May 1944. At that time 7 Field Company IE was commanded by Major Peter Fraser, MC, second in command was Captain 'Dickie' Richards and there were three platoons each with a strength of about 60 men. Charles D'Arcy Champney led the Hindu A Platoon, Trevor Thornton had B Platoon who were the Sikhs, and I had C Platoon Punjabi Mussulmans.

7 Company's task was to assist 17 Brigade in crossing the Rapido. Rafts to get anti-tank guns over quickly were to be built and operated by A and B platoons behind the lst Frontier Force Rifles and the lst Royal Fusiliers and C platoon had a class 30 Bailey Bridge to build, code name CARDIFF on the Division's right flank. In addition A and B had mine clearing and general supporting tasks on the approach tracks. 'CARDIFF' was to be built as a 60-70 foot double single bridge with all speed and put down on the far bank with minimum bank-seat preparation. It was envisaged that because of the marshy nature of the site the bridge would be abandoned after a few hours use but by that time would have served its purpose. The bridging site for CARDIFF was chosen to provide support for the Royal Fusiliers, the assault battalion on the Divisional right and because it was anticipated that it would be in a comparatively quiet area. Events proved differently and 'CARDIFF' was found to be anything but quiet and speedy. Two other bridges were planned along the Divisional front, 'OXFORD' and 'PLYMOUTH' a tank mounted bridge to be launched by 66 Company.

Difficulties started for 'C' platoon even before the night of the assault. The penultimate night shift we were mine clearing in the forward area. I had called a halt just before dawn and we were making our own way back to our truck rendezvous when Platoon Havildar Aslub Khan, straying by some mischance outside the cleared area, stepped on a schumine and lost his leg. He was a senior long serving NCO greatly valued and respected and as there was no Jemadar appointed to the platoon this was a very serious blow for us.

The night of the 10 May before the assault we moved forward to allotted assembly areas within easy reach of the river front where we dug in and camouflaged ourselves under bushes and loose scrub. The area being under direct observation from the Monastery hill we were at pains to remain completely under cover during the following daylight hours. Time to contemplate the tasks ahead and ponder on the rumours that knowledgeable Americans were offering considerable odds against our success!

The artillery barrage from some 1600 guns of all type must have been the biggest since El Alamein and starting on the dot of 11 pm proved a mind numbing experience in its intensity.

Following my orders I marshalled my platoon and led off at 11.30 along my route to the river. By this time visibility was already bad, a combination of summer mist, smoke, and dust with no breeze to move it and I passed the order back for all to stay in close contact. To no avail, when I arrived at the edge of the flood plain where our work was to commence only half my platoon came in behind me. I sent a runner back to try and make contact with and bring up the missing section. In due course they arrived to report that they had brushed with a German patrol evidently caught on our side of the river. Seeing my platoon crossing their path in 'Indian file' they had thrown a couple of grenades and exchanged some fire before disappearing into the fog. One of my sappers had been wounded and of course the platoon movement had been severed. At the front of the column it was impossible to have heard this local fracas, the overall noise level being deafening.

Meanwhile the immediate tasks were to bridge a series of drainage ditches which criss-crossed the flat land on our side of the river and which it had not been possible to work on prior to the assault because of the closeness of the enemy positions and disclosing our plans. The larger ditches were to be dealt with using culvert barrels and infill under bridging ramp units and the smaller shallower ditches were generally to be filled in and covered with timber in order to get the bridging lorries forward to the river edge.

'A' Platoon were supposed to be clearing and preparing my route to the river but they were not on site and must have been delayed on one of their other tasks so I put my sappers to work using the barrels and other stores which we had previously hidden nearby in a deep ditch.

Taking an NCO I set off to make a reconnaissance to my bridge site. Visibility along the bottom land and the river front was by this time very bad, down to about six feet and was a mixed blessing. I think most of the fog in that area was from generated smoke both ours and the enemy's. The latter had staked out smoke bombs, warnings and grenades with trip wires many of which were triggered and the middle of my route one of our LAA jeep trailers loaded with smoke canisters received a hit and proceeded to belch smoke for most of the night. We stumbled forward guided by the noise of intense small arms fire, and found our way to the river bank. Along this near side of the Rapido we had a continuous banked up area which I imagine was the result of some agricultural dredging and clearing operation to improve the flow of the river which lived up to its historic name and fortunately this bank gave us some protection from the enemy's fire. It did however present us with a bridging difficulty, we could not build up and launch over this obstacle which was several feet high and bulldozing through it was not a practical solution in the circumstances. Prior reconnaissance however had shown us that there was just one place in the vicinity where we could build. A long earthen ramp existing leading to the top of the bank, and this was to be our launching site. I found it in the dark without too much difficulty but discovered it was already occupied, the centre of considerable attention, the Royal Fusiliers had chosen this precise point for their crossing of the river and their Beach Master had established his command point slap in the middle of my only possible launching site. Their crossing may have been swept down from further to the right by the current, as this tended to happen, but there he was and he was not very happy. He was having communication difficulties. The Royal Fusiliers progress was slow and difficult; they were at that time not very far forward from the other bank and casualties mounting. The enemy had identified the point of crossing and were bringing considerable defensive fire to bear on it. The arrival of a sapper bridging party which was likely to attract even more unwelcome attention was not good news at that time and there was no way he could or would relocate.

I crawled up the bank to try and assess the bridging problem but there was nothing to see. The water was invisible somewhere below me. I could hear it but not see it and the same applied to the small arms fire coming over somewhere above me, altogether a peculiar sensation. It was certainly not a very good place to attempt building a bridge under the prevailing circumstances so I decided to make a reconnaissance along the bank to see whether there was any alternative. First however I needed to report and to check the progress of my platoon. Even before I reached them it was clear we had another problem, our approach route was being systematically shelled with little respite. It was one of the approach routes the Americans had used earlier in the year, their battle debris was still around, and the German gunners had the range well calculated. We were able to gain some cover in the drainage ditches we were working on but they took some direct hits and inevitably during the course of the night we did suffer casualties. Within a few minutes of my returning from my reconnaissance we found we had another problem. A section of sappers ramping up earth to the ends of the steel bridging ramps suddenly discovered that their picks were unearthing German schumines! We were working in a mined area that was supposed to have been cleared. In the darkness and poor visibility there was no telling where the mines were, with wooden cases they gave little response to detectors and they were planted randomly by enemy patrols. It was possible this particular sowing had been planted that night just prior to our arrival. In spite of the warning it was only a matter of minutes before four sappers carrying a ramp became casualties and we spent the rest of the night working with the knowledge that every step was a hazard.

When I set off on a second reconnaissance it was with the CO, Major Fraser. Reaching the river we had 4th British Division somewhere on our right so we had to search downstream to our left for an alternative bridging site. This was in the direction of San Angelo on high ground immediately the other side of the river. The Rapido twisted and snaked and the drainage ditches through which we stumbled were all at irregular angles without pattern so in the darkness it was not very long before we became disorientated until we discovered we were right in front of and beneath San Angelo identifiable by the continuous enemy machine gun fire coming our way. No place for a bridge. To avoid such disorientation and so maintain direction of attack the LAA were firing a pre-arranged pattern of tracer shells over our heads at fixed intervals and on known bearings -the problem was that because of the fog and smoke we could not see them.

We failed to find an alternative site for our bridge and we spent the rest of a very difficult night working on the preparation of the track towards the RF crossing. As the dawn came visibility began to lengthen and with early daylight we were coming under observation from San Angelo still firmly held by the enemy. The area became untenable for engineer working and we were ordered to withdraw to our earlier assembly area and regroup for a further effort the next night, but in the meanwhile the other two bridges had fared better and were under way and completed before the morning was too far advanced. Our territorial gain and hold on the other side of the river was still rather tenuous but two bridges across helped to strengthen the Division's position. B platoon took over the task of maintenance on OXFORD an uncomfortable role because it came under heavy regular fire from the enemy artillery and one Luftwaffe sortie but fortunately escaped serious damage.

As soon as darkness gave us cover A and C platoons went forward again only to find the position in our sector had not changed much during the day and we were under intensive fire most of the night as we completed the track and moved bridging material forward. Both platoons suffered casualties and 'D'Arcy' leading A platoon was badly wounded. He survived and I was later able to visit him in hospital where I found him very proud of the amount of penicillin he had been given. Penicillin was the new thing and had just arrived. He was subsequently repatriated and I never saw him again.

The next day the Ghurkas stormed and took San Angelo relieving the pressure on our immediate front and allowing completion of the bridge, a relief in many ways to all concerned including 4 British Division on our right whose engineers had suffered similar experiences to ours and were even more badly delayed. Our role then changed, with the enemy starting to withdraw, we moved across into San Angelo clearing mines and marking routes until the Brigade handed over and was withdrawn, to rest and reform.

The final section of my Dad’s story relates the chase up Italy and his experience on the Ponte Vecchio.

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